packaging configurations which were safe for short-term storage may not be safe for long-term storage. Interviews with Rocky Flats personnel involved with packaging the residues reveal that more than one packaging configuration was used for some of the residues. A tabulation of packaging configurations was developed based on the information obtained from the interviews. A number of potential safety problems were identified during this study, including hydrogen generation from some residues and residue packaging materials, contamination containment loss, metal residue packaging container corrosion, and pyrophoric plutonium compound formation. Risk factors were developed for evaluating the risk potential of the various residue categories, and the residues in storage at Rocky Hats were ranked by risk potential.
Preliminary drum head space gas sampling studies have demonstrated the potential for formation of flammable hydrogen-oxygen mixtures in some residue drums.
SUMMARY
When plutonium operations at Rocky Flats were curtailed in December 1989, a large number of residue drums stored in the drum backlog were awaiting processing. Most of these residues had been packaged assuming they would be processed fairly quickly and would remain in storage for, at most, a few years. Plutonium operations at Rocky Flats have now been curtailed for over four years, and several more years will be required before any operations to process the residue drum backlog can be started. Since the residues have already been stored far longer than was originally planned, concerns have been raised about the safety risks involved in continued storage of these residues. Therefore, a study was conducted to evaluate the risks involved with continued storage of the residues in the drum backlog.
This study was conducted by first developing a database which contained information on all of the 55-gallon residue drums currently stored in the backlog. This database was developed by combining information from the Safeguards and Accountability Network (SAN) and the Waste and Environmental Management System (WEMS). The new database was developed because early in the study the fact became apparent that neither the SAN nor the WEMS databases contained all of the information required for a residue drum safety study.
The next step in the residue drum safety study was to obtain information on the packaging configurations used for the various residue Item Description Code (IDC) categories. The residue packaging configuration information was obtained from data in waste packaging procedures WO-4034, "Radioactive Waste Packaging Requirements," and WO-1100, "Solid Radioactive Waste Packaging Inside the PA," and by conducting interviews with operations personnel who have worked in the process areas for a number of years. These interviews revealed that for many of the residue categories, several different packaging configurations have been used for the same residue.
Risk factors were then developed which identified the potential risks associated with residues stored in the drum backlog. These risk factors are (1) gas generation, (2) contamination containment loss, (3) drum and residue packaging corrosion, and (4) reactive metals and compounds.
iii Several potential mechanisms were identified for gas generation in residue drums. These mechanisms include (1) radiolysis of water, (2) radiolytic degradation of organic material, (3) acidmetal reactions between mild steel drums and acid vapors, and (4) reaction of water with reactive metals. These gas generation mechanisms result in the generation of hydrogen, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and other gases.
Contamination containment loss occurs from degradation of plastic packaging materials by heat, radiation, and acid vapors. Heat, radiation, and acid vapors can also degrade the adhesive on the tape used to seal plastic bags, which can result in seal loss.
Fifty-five gallon d~rum and drum-vent filter assembly corrosion occurs as a result of attack by acid vapors or chlorinated solvents from residues containing residual acid or solvents. Corrosion of metal cans used to store chloride salt residue can occur if the salts absorb moisture.
Some pyrochemicad salt residues contain residual plutonium metal that may react with water in the drum atmosphere to produce compounds such as plutonium hydride or plutonium oxide hydride that are more pyrophoric than plutonium metal. Strong nitric acid reacts with the lead oxide layer in leaded drybox g:loves to produce compounds that are highly flammable and shock sensitive when dried.
Each of the residue IDC categories was evaluated to determine which of the risk factors might be associated with that particular IDC. The IDC categories were then assigned a risk potential, based upon the number of risk factors associated with the IDC and an estimate of the magnitude of the risk associated with each risk factor for the IDC. Risk potentiads of one to five were used for ranking the IDC categories, with one being the highest risk potential and five being the lowest. IDC categories witlh no risk factors were given a iv risk potential of five. The residue categories that were assigned a risk potential of one were skulls, non-spec oxide, peroxide cake, Ful-Flo filters, wet combustibles, electrorefining salts, unpulverized molten salt extraction salts, several miscellaneous pyrochemical salt categories, and acid-contaminated leaded drybox gloves.
The residue drum safety study identified no imminent safety hazards. However, the potential safety risks that were identified appear to be sufficiently real to warrant further investigation. These potential safety risks include (1) residue drum pressurization, (2) residue drum hydrogen accumulation, (3) contamination containment loss in residue packages and drums, (4) drum and drum-vent filter assembly corrosion, (5) metal residue container corrosion, and (6) pyrophoric or unstable compound formation in drums containing plutonium or reactive metals. While a number of potential mechanisms were identified that could result in safety risks, other factors were also identified which could offset the identified risks. The conclusion was that all the information required to determine the extent of the hazard posed by these potential safety risks is not currently available.
INTRODUCTION
Plutonium operations at Rocky Flats were curtailed following the inventory conducted in November 1989. At that time, the curtailment was expected to last only for a few months. The curtailment has now lasted for over four years, and several more years will be required before any operations dealing with the residue drum backlog can be started. Most of the residues in the drum backlog were packaged assuming they would remain in storage for a few months to, at most, a few years. Some of these residues have been in storage for over 10 years, and none of the residues have been in storage less than three years. Since the residues have already been stored far longer than was originally planned, concerns have been raised about the safety risks involved in their continued storage.
Because of these concerns, a study was conducted to evaluate potential risks involved with continued residue storage in the drum backlog and to recommend actions to be taken to determine whether any potential risks actually exist. The study was limited to residues stored in 55-gallon drums because other studies are being conducted to identify storage risks for material stored in vaults and 10-gallon drums. This study was conducted by first developing a database which contained information on all %-gallon drums currently stored in the backlog that were listed as residue drums in the Waste Type field in the Waste and Environmental Management System (WEMS) database. Most Item Description Code (IDC) categories contain both residue and waste drums. However, in many cases, the drums of potential concern are those drums containing the most plutonium. Conclusions reached concerning residue drums can be applied to waste drums in the same IDC if the concern is independent of plutonium concentration.
Packaging configuration information used for the residue drums was obtained from Rocky Flats Plant waste packaging procedures and from interviews conducted with operations personnel who have worked in the process areas for a number of years. These interviews revealed some inconsistencies in the packaging configurations used. For a given IDC, more than one packaging configuration may exist in the residue drum backlog. However, a table was developed showing the most probable packaging configuration for the various IDCs, based upon waste packaging procedure information and the operations personnel interviews. This table also contains probable alternate packaging configuration information for some of the IDCs.
Several risk factors were developed which identified the potential risks associated with residues stored in the drum backlog. Each IDC was then evaluated to determine if any of the risk factors applied. Each IDC was assigned a risk potential of one to five based upon the risk factors, with one being the highest risk potential and five being the lowest. The IDCs were then ranked by risk potential. After the IDCs had been evaluated and ranked, recommendations for verifying the existence of the identified risks were developed.
The purpose of this report is to document the methodology used for the residue drum safety study and to describe the results of the study. The report describes the database development work, the risk factors development, and the ranking of the IDCs by risk potential. Recommendations for verifying the existence of the identified risks are given at the end of the report.
DATABASE DEVELOPMENT
The fmt step in the residue drum safety study was to obtain information on the drums stored in the residue drum backlog. Currently two databases at Rocky Flats contain information on residue drums. These databases, Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) and Waste and Environmental Management System (WEMS), designed for different purposes, are incompatible with each other. Each contains useful information for the residue drum safety study; however,
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Evaluation of Residue Drum Storage Safety R i s b no easy way existed to correlate their information. In addition, some of the information required for the residue drum safety study is not contained in either database. For example, neither the SAN nor the WEMS database contains information on the packaging configurations existing in residue drums. Early in the study the need for a new database containing the information required for the residue drum safety study became apparent.
A residue drum databae was developed by SNM Management personnel by combining information from the S A N and WEMS databases. New database development. was started by compiling SAN data from all packages of material in the residue IDCs. These data were then sorted to eliminate all material not stored in 55-gallon drums. WEMS database information was then compiled for all 55-gaillon drums in the residue IDCs. The WEMS data were sorted to extract the drums identified as residue drums in the Waste Type field. The WEMS data for these residue drums were then combined with the SAN data. This new residue drum database was then sorted by IDC in various ways to prepare the tables contained in this report.
RESIDUE PACKAGING
General packaging requirements for Rocky Hats generated waste are contained in Waste Operations procedure WO-4034, "Radioactive Waste Packaging Requirements." Specific requirements for packaging waste generated in the Protected Area (PA) at Rocky Flats are given in Waste Operations procedure WO-1 100, "Solid Radioactive Waste Packaging Inside the PA." WO-4034 has been in existence for a number of years, but WO-1100 was developed only a few years ago. Most drum backlog residue was generated prior to the (development of WO-1100, and waste and residue packaging requirements have changed several times in the past 10 to 15 years. Because of these changes, multiple packaging configurations exist in the residue drum backlog. To gain a better understanding of these packaging configurations, interviews were conducted with Operations and other personnel who were involved with residue packaging operations during the time when most of the drum backlog residue was generated.
A matrix was developed which contained the type of containers and packaging materials known to have been used over the years for packaging residues. The personnel who were interviewed were asked to check the types of packaging material used for the various IDC categories. The completed matrix forms were then evaluated to determine the most probable packaging configurations; this packaging configuration information is given in Table 1 . Table  1 is constructed to show the inner most packaging containers first. Moving from left to right across the table, subsequent layers of packaging materials are shown. The last column is for the rigid liner, which is the last layer of packaging inside the 55-gallon drum.
For each IDC, an "X" is placed in the columns to the right of the IDC description that corresponds to the most probable packaging materials used for residue in the IDC category. If probable alternate packaging material was identified during the evaluation, an "A" is placed in the column for that material. For example, most people interviewed indicated that incinerator sludge, IDC 292, is packaged in four-liter plastic bottles which were removed from the glovebox using a polyvinyl chloride (PVC) O-ring bag, which was sealed with yellow tape. The bagged four-liter bottle was then placed in a polyethylene bag sealed with tape, and the double-bagged bottle was then placed in a drum lined with one 55-gallon drum liner and one round-bottom drum liner. However, one of the people interviewed indicated that the double-bagged bottle was placed in a clam shell before being placed in the drum. Therefore, the clam shell column for incinerator sludge contains an "A," indicating that some of the double-bagged, four-liter bottles of incinerator sludge are contained in a clam shell. Another person stated that rigid liners jng configuratims.
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were used for incinerator sludge drums; therefore, the rigid liner column for incinerator sludge contains an "A."
A clam shell is a seven-inch diameter by 14-inch tall polyethylene container with threads in the middle of the container (see Figure 1) . Clam shells are used to package residue that might contain free liquids. Examples of residues that are packaged in clam shells are sludge, Ful-Flo fdters, and wet combustibles. Table 1 indicates that all of the residue drums contain one 55-gallon liner and one roundbottom drum liner. However, some of the people interviewed indicated rhat some of the drums were prepared using a second 55-gallon liner in place of the round-bttom liner. Packaging configurations for some of the residue IDC categories in the drum backlog probably are not reflected in Table 1 ; hiowever, the information in Table 1 reflects the packaging configuration for most of the residues in the various IDC categories.
RISK FACTORS
Risk factors for drums in the residue drum backlog were developed based upon the author's research and developrnient and plutonium processing experience andl upon interviews with Operations, Process Technology and Support, and other personnel with plutonium processing and handling experience. Risk factors developed for this study are listed below and discussed in the following sections.
Gas Generation
Contamination Containment Loss
Drum and Residue Packaging Corrosion
Reactive Metals and Compounds
Some residue categories have the potential for more than one of the risk factors. For example, 8 some drums of Ful-Flo filters could have three of the four risk factors.
Gas Generation
Gas generation in residue drums can result in two potential problems: (1) pressurization of the drum or the packages in the drum, and (2) accumulation of hydrogen in the drum. Gas generation can result from four sources: (1) radiolytic decomposition of water and organic materials, (2) acid-metal reactions, (3) bacterial reactions with organic materials,' and (4) reaction of water with reactive metals. Radiolytic decomposition of water produces hydrogen and oxygen, and radiolytic decomposition of organic materials can produce hydrogen, in addition to other gases2 The type of gases generated from the radiolytic decomposition of organic materials depends upon the organic material involved. For a given type of material, the gas generation rate from radiolytic decomposition is directly proportional to the amount of energy deposited in the material. If plutonium is in direct contact with organic material, the energy is deposited in the form of both alpha particles and gamma radiation. If plutonium is contained in a metal container, the alpha particles are stopped by the metal, but some of the gamma radiation can penetrate the metal container. In this case, some of the gamma radiation energy will be deposited in the plastic packaging materials surrounding the metal can. The plutonium in the residue drum backlog is a mixture of plutonium isotopes, with one of the isotopes being The decays to %lAm which is approximately 50 times as active as %(3.47 C i g vs 0.0629 Wg, respectively). Therefore, as the decays to =lAm, the energy released per gram of plutonium increases, and the gas generation rate increases as the plutonium in the residue drum backlog ages. Other factors affect the radiolytic gas generation rate, such as the particle size of the plutonium and the distribution of plutonium in the residue matrix. The americium content of most of the drums in the residue drum backlog is not known, and the plutonium particle size and distribution also are not known. Because of this lack of information, prediction of the radiolytic gas generation rate for any particular drum is difficult. However, identification of IDC categories which are likely to have high gas generation rates is possible, based upon existing experimental data.
Acid-metal reactions, such as reaction of nitric acid with mild steel drums, produce hydrogen and corrosion of the mild steel. Another source for gas generation is bacterial action. Carbon dioxide is the primary gas expected to be produced from bacterial action.' Reactive metals, such as sodium, potassium, calcium, and magnesium, react with water to produce hydrogen.
Residue drums containing high organic material and/or liquid content produce the largest quantities of gas. Drums with a high gas generation rate have the highest potential for pressurization, either of the drum or packages in the drum, and for accumulation of hydrogen in the drum. Wet and dry combustibles, plastic, and drybox gloves are residue categories that can have high gas generation rates. Since all residue drums contain plastic packaging material, some residues that normally would not be considered to have a high gas generation potential may fit into this risk category. An example of this type of residue is drums of molten salt extraction (MSE) salts with high plutonium and americium contents.
Contamination Containment Loss
Contamination containment loss results from several different mechanisms. Plastic packaging materials are degraded by heat and radiation, and the degradation process is accelerated if both heat and radiation are present. PVC exposure to radiation results in dehydrochlorination, with the evolution of hydrogen chloride (HCl). Heating PVC in air results in thermal oxidation and loss of strength, and the rate of degradation increases rapidly with increasing tem~erature.~ Radiation, heat, and nitric and hydrochloric acid vapors can degrade the adhesive on the yellow tape used to seal plastic bags, which can result in seal loss. While reactive metals and compounds are primarily associated with pyrochemical salts, at least one non-pyrochemical salt residue may contain reactive compounds. Studies conducted at Rocky Flats have shown that a highly flammable and shock-sensitive material is formed when leaded drybox gloves are exposed to strong nitric acid.1213 The yellowish material formed when nitric acid reacts with the lead oxide loaded glove layer is not a hazard as long as it is wet, but the material becomes very reactive when dried. This yellowish material was identified as a mixture of carboxylic acids containing nitro groups and lead nitrate. Many gloves in this IDC category (IDC 341) were coated with nitric acid when they were removed from the glovebox. The nitric acid could be degrading the packaging materials, and the flammable, shocksensitive material could be present on some of these gloves. If the gloves are stored in contact with nitric acid, the reactions which produce the flammable, shock-sensitive material could be occurring in the drums. Since all the residue drums containing acid contaminated drybox gloves should now be equipped with vent fiiters, the gloves could dry if they are stored for a sufficient period of time.
RESIDUE IDC RISK RANKINGS
The risk factors defined and discussed in the Risk Factors section were used to rank the various residue IDC categories by potential risk. Each residue IDC was evaluated to determine which of the risk factors might be associated with that particular IDC. The IDC categories were then assigned a risk potential, based upon the number of risk factors associated with the IDC and an estimate of the magnitude of the risk associated with each risk factor for the IDC.
Risk potentials of one to five were used for ranking the IDC categories, with one being the highest risk potential and five being the lowest.
IDC categories for which no risk factors were assigned were given a risk potential of five. The assignment of risk potentials was necessarily subjective, based upon the author's knowledge of and experience with the type of residue in each of the IDC categories. However, the purpose of this risk ranking was to provide a priority list for obtaining additional infoxmation on the true condition of the residues in the drum backlog.
The IDC categories with the highest risk rankings are the categories which should be investigated first in any program designed to obtain additional information on the current condition of the residues in the drum backlog.
A listing of the residue IDC categories currently REP4826 stored in 55-gallon drums in the drum backlog is given in Table 2 IDCs into risk potential categories was difficult because of the lack of data on the actual condition of residues in the drum backlog. Sorting
IDCs within a risk potential category will not be possible until additional data are obtained.
As was stated previously, assignment of a risk potential to the various IDC categories was somewhat subjective; however, all IDC categories with a risk potential of one were assigned that risk potential for specific reasons. The one drum of IDC 050 (Skulls) is a good example. Skulls are a mixture of oxide, sub-oxide, and metal produced in a casting operation; they are very pyrophoric. The possibility exists that the drum has been misidentified and the material in the drum is not really'skulls. The drum is listed in SAN with a net weight of 7 100 grams and a plutonium weight of 239 grams. The plutonium assay implied by these weights is much too low for casting skulls. However, if the drum, number D74309 16, really does contain casting skulls, the drum should be opened as soon as possible and the material placed into a safe storage configuration. This drum has been identified as one of the containers to be opened and inspected during Phase 1 of the HSP 3 1.1 1 Inspection Plan program. 14 The drums of IDC 061 (Non-Spec Oxide) and IDC 080 (Peroxide Cake) were given a risk potential of one because a 55-gallon drum is not and IDC 422 (Soot) were both assigned risk factor one, gas generation. However, IDC 337 was assigned a risk potential of two, and IDC 422 was assigned a risk potential of three. The reason the IDCs were assigned different risk potentials was that while both plastic and soot have the potential for gas generation, the gas generation rate from plastic is greater than the gas generation rate expected from soot1
The statement was made previously in this report that this study was limited to residue drums.
However, some waste drums were included in the data used to develop the numbers given in Table 2 
DISCUSSION
The major difficulty encountered in attempting to assess the potential safety risks in the residue drum backlog is the lack of data on the actual conditions that currently exist in the drums stored in the backlog. Experimental data do exist for the gas generation rates for a few of the IDC categories, but gas generation rate information is not available for most of the IDC categories. A similar lack of data exists for the other risk factors defined in this report. Another problem is lack of documentation for packaging configurations that actually exist in the drums stored in the residue drum backlog. A central location for data on the current condition of the drums in the residue drum backlog is needed.
The WEMS database currently contains information on drums in the drum backlog, and upgrading WEMS to include information on the condition of backlog residue drums might be possible.
Gas Generation
The INEL gas sampling study referred to previously was conducted on waste drums generated in the 1970s and early 1 9 Gas generation rate data for anion exchange resin and a few other materials were determined in a study conducted at Rocky Hats? The data were used to calculate the expected gas composition in the backlog resin drums that contain the highest plutonium concentrations. These calculations were performed assuming that the drums are sealed and that all gases generated remain in the drums. This assumption is known to be false, because some of the hydrogen and other gases generated in the drums diffuses through the drum-lid gaskets. However, the calculations served as a starting point in developing models that might be useful in predicting gas compositions in residue drums. The results of these first calculations, given in Table 3 , show that resin drums could contain as much as 15 volume percent hydrogen if all of the gas generated remained in the drum.
The next step in the model development effort was to obtain actual gas samples from some of the resin drums and compare the actual gas compositions with the calculated compositions. The analyzed and calculated gas compositions for the first two drums that were sampled are shown in Table 4 . As expected, the actual hydrogen content in the drums was much lower than the calculated hydrogen content. The difference in the actual and calculated hydrogen contents in these two drums was used to calculate gas permeability constants for the foam gaskets used on the dnims. These gas penneability constants were then used to recalculate the expected gas compositions in the high plutonium content resin drums that had not yet been sampled. Three more of the high plutonium content resin drums have now been sampled. The recalculated gas compositions are given in Table 5 , along with the measured gas compositions. The gas permeability constants used to recalculate the expected gas compositions are also given in Table 5 .
A comparison of the recalculated and measured gas compositions in Table 5 shows that the measured hydrogen concentration in the drums was still less than the recalculated compositions.
The resin drum gas sampling results show that the rate of hydrogen permeation through the foam, drum-lid gasket jis sufficient to maintain the hydrogen concentraition in the resin drums below the lower flammability limit for hydrogen.
The gas sampling results indicate that hydrogen build up in resin drums should not be a problem if the drums are equipped with foam gaskets. However, the experimentally determined hydrogen generation rate for resin is only 14 ml/yr/g Pu.2 The experimentally determined hydrogen generation rate for dry combustibles, IDC 330, is 180 ml/yr/g Pu, or an order of magnitude greater than the hydrogen generation rate for resin.' The possibility exists that tme hydrogen generation rate for some residues would be so great IMJ categories 330,336,337,338,   339 , and 341 were not equipped with drum-vent filter assemblies. A project was put in place to obtain gas samples from these 19 drums, vent the drums to remove any hydrogen in the drums, and replace the dnun lids with lids containing carbon composite filter a~semblies.'~ As part of the gas sampling and lid replacement project, the operators perfoming the work were asked to determine the type of drum-lid gasket.
The initial reports indicated that all 19 drums were fitted with soEd gaskets. However, further investigation revealed that some of the gaskets may have been foam gaskets. A more detailed investigation of 17 of the 19 drum lids revealed that 14 lids are equipped with foam gaskets, and three lids are equipped with solid, tubular gaskets. Unfortunately, by the time the more detailed investigation was conducted, determining which lid had been removed from which drum was impossible. However, the fact that three drum lids are equipped with tubular gaskets confirms that some drums in the residue drum backlog are equipped with solid, tubular gaskets. (Table 9) drums. In most of the drums where the hydrogen concentration was higher than expected, the oxygen concentration was lower than expected. These concentrations are not surprising since the radiolysis reactions that generate hydrogen consume oxygen.
Prior to the start of gas sampling operations on the 19 drums of combustible residues, calculations were performed to determine the expected and worst case hydrogen concentration in the 15 drums containing material for which gas generation rate information was available. The expected and worst case gas compositions were calculated, based upon gas generation rates determined previously at Rocky Flats on drums of actual waste and residue.' The expected gas composition calculations were performed assuming that the drum lids were fitted with foam gaskets. Another assumption was that the equilibrium partial pressure of each individual gas in a drum would be the pressure at which the gas generation rate would equal the gas permeation rate through the dnun gasket. The gas permeation rates used for these calculations w m deterrnined from the gas sampling operations conducted on drums of ion exchange resin which were all fitted with foam gaskets. Calculations for worst case hydrogen concentmionis w a pedoxmed assuming a sealed drum and that all of the hydrogen gener-
atedwouldremaininthedrum.
m e calculated expected and worst case gas compositions are shown in Tables 6 through 9 , along with the measured gas compositions for the 15 drums containing material for which gas generation rate information was available. The worst case gas compositions are shown in these tables in the "Type of Result" column as "Calculated, No Loss". The expected gas compositions are shown in the "Type of Result" column as "Calculated, Foam Gasket." As expected, none of the measured hydrogen concentrations is even close to the worst case hydrogen concentrations.
For the IDC 330 (Tablc 6) and IDC 337 ( Table 8) drums, the measured hydrogen concentrations were much lower than the calculated, expected hydrogen concentratioiis.
For the IDC 336 (Tablt: 7) drums, some of the measured hydrogen coincentrations were much higher than the calculated, expected hydrogen concentrations. The best agreement between measured and calculated, expected hydrogen
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The wide variation between the expected and measured gas compositions can be explained by several factors: (1) the gas generation rate data used for calculating the expected gas compositions are based on measurements from only a few drums for each IDC category; (2) large variations in gas generation rates between drums in the same IDC category were observed during the gas generation rate experiments; (3) gas generation rates are dependent not only on the type of material and plutonium content, but upon the amount of plutonium in direct contact with the material being irradiated, and (4) a wide variation in gas permeation rates exists from gasket to gasket. Experiments were conducted at Rocky Flats to determine the gas permeation rates for samples of foam, drum gasket material. 18 The measured gas permeation rates vary from 7 x lo4 to 1 x W1 moles/second/centimeter squared x torr for hydrogen and from 1 x lo7
to 1 x for oxygen.
Gas permeation rates were calculated for each of the 15 drums. The permeation rates were calculated based upon experimental gas generation rate data and the measured gas composition in the drums. ' The results of these calculations are given in Table 10 , along with the average permeation rate calculated for the five ion exchange resin drum gaskets. As the results in Table 10 show, a wide variation in permeation rate is found from drum to drum.
The results from the gas sampling operation show why fitting drums of combustible material with vent filters is important, The one drum of IDC 341 material, D60056, which contained the largest quantity of plutonium, contained a hydrogen-oxygen mixture that was close to the flam- Table 6 Calculated and Actual Gas Composition a n d Clam shells were filled with water through a hole in one end of the clam shell, and water began leaking through the threads as soon as the water level reached the top of the threads.
Gas generation problems are usually thought of as being confined to residues containing high concentrations of organic materials or liquids. However, the information in Table 1 indicates that gas generation problems could be associated with some of the pyrochemical salt residues. Some people interviewed indicated that pyrochemical salts are sometimes placed in plastic freezettes or two-liter plastic bottles before being removed from the glovebox. If pyrochemical salts with high plutonium and americium concentrations are stored in plastic containers, high hydrogen generation rates could result from radiolytic degradation of the plastic.
A review of the residue drum database shows that most of the pyrochemical salts are stored in non-vented drums. If a non-vented drum contains high plutonium and americium content salts stored in plastic containers, then the possibility exists that the drum could be pressurized and could contain high hydrogen concentrations.
Contamination Containment Loss
Very little data exist on the incidence of contamination containment loss in residue drums. However, the incidence has been high enough in the past to lead to the installation of a Contamination Control Cell in Building 771 and down-draft rooms in Building 37 1. Installation of these contamination control facilities was prompted by past contamination incidents which occurred while opening residue drums during recovery operations. The drum residue backlog was packaged assuming short term storage (up to approximately two years) until the residue could be processed for plutonium recovery. The drum residue backlog is now destined to be stored for many years before the final disposition of the residue is determined. If problems with contamination containment loss have occurred in the past when the residue was being stored for shorter time periods, then incidents of contamination containment loss would be expected to increase during the long storage periods currently planned for the residue. A gas sampling and drum venting project conducted on 19 drums of combustible material in the fall of 1993 was described previously in this report. The gas samples obtained from four drums containing acid-contaminated drybox gloves (IDC 341) were also analyzed for NOx. The results from these gas samples showed that three of the four IDC 341 drums contained elevated concentrations of NOx (from 0.147 to 1.399 volume 9%). The elevated NOx concentrations indicate that these drums contain nitric acid, which could be reacting with the leaded layer of the gloves stored in these drums to form the flammable, shock-sensitive material. Gas sampling project results showed that venting these IDC 341 drums is necessary to prevent a buildup of flammable hydrogen-oxygen mixtures. However, venting of the drums accelerates drying of the gloves.
Drum and Residue Packaging Corrosion
A number of potential safety problems that could exist in the residue drum backlog have been identified in this report. However, very little data exists that can be used to verify the existence of the potential safety problems or to determine the severity of the safety risks. A number of steps have been proposed to obtain the data required to quantify the extent of the
